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Brooks:The End of Philosophy

Brooks:The End of Philosophy

Op-Ed Columnist

The End of Philosophy

By David Brooks

Published: April 6, 2009

Socrates talked. The assumption behind his approach to philosophy, and the approaches of millions of people since, is that moral thinking is mostly a matter of reason and deliberation: Think through moral problems. Find a just principle. Apply it.

One problem with this kind of approach to morality, as Michael Gazzaniga writes in his 2008 book, “Human,” is that “it has been hard to find any correlation between moral reasoning and proactive moral behavior, such as helping other people. In fact, in most studies, none has been found.”

Today, many psychologists, cognitive scientists and even philosophers embrace a different view of morality. In this view, moral thinking is more like aesthetics. As we look around the world, we are constantly evaluating what we see. Seeing and evaluating are not two separate processes. They are linked and basically simultaneous.

As Steven Quartz of the California Institute of Technology said during a recent discussion of ethics sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation, “Our brain is computing value at every fraction of a second. Everything that we look at, we form an implicit preference. Some of those make it into our awareness; some of them remain at the level of our unconscious, but ... what our brain is for, what our brain has evolved for, is to find what is of value in our environment.”

Think of what happens when you put a new food into your mouth. You don’t have to decide if it’s disgusting. You just know. You don’t have to decide if a landscape is beautiful. You just know.

Moral judgments are like that. They are rapid intuitive decisions and involve the emotion-processing parts of the brain. Most of us make snap moral judgments about what feels fair or not, or what feels good or not. We start doing this when we are babies, before we have language. And even as adults, we often can’t explain to ourselves why something feels wrong.

In other words, reasoning comes later and is often guided by the emotions that preceded it. Or as Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia memorably wrote, “The emotions are, in fact, in charge of the temple of morality, and ... moral reasoning is really just a servant masquerading as a high priest.”

The question then becomes: What shapes moral emotions in the first place? The answer has long been evolution, but in recent years there’s an increasing appreciation that evolution isn’t just about competition. It’s also about cooperation within groups. Like bees, humans have long lived or died based on their ability to divide labor, help each other and stand together in the face of common threats. Many of our moral emotions and intuitions reflect that history. We don’t just care about our individual rights, or even the rights of other individuals. We also care about loyalty, respect, traditions, religions. We are all the descendents of successful cooperators.

The first nice thing about this evolutionary approach to morality is that it emphasizes the social nature of moral intuition. People are not discrete units coolly formulating moral arguments. They link themselves together into communities and networks of mutual influence.

The second nice thing is that it entails a warmer view of human nature. Evolution is always about competition, but for humans, as Darwin speculated, competition among groups has turned us into pretty cooperative, empathetic and altruistic creatures — at least within our families, groups and sometimes nations.

The third nice thing is that it explains the haphazard way most of us lead our lives without destroying dignity and choice. Moral intuitions have primacy, Haidt argues, but they are not dictators. There are times, often the most important moments in our lives, when in fact we do use reason to override moral intuitions, and often those reasons — along with new intuitions — come from our friends.

The rise and now dominance of this emotional approach to morality is an epochal change. It challenges all sorts of traditions. It challenges the bookish way philosophy is conceived by most people. It challenges the Talmudic tradition, with its hyper-rational scrutiny of texts. It challenges the new atheists, who see themselves involved in a war of reason against faith and who have an unwarranted faith in the power of pure reason and in the purity of their own reasoning.

Finally, it should also challenge the very scientists who study morality. They’re good at explaining how people make judgments about harm and fairness, but they still struggle to explain the feelings of awe, transcendence, patriotism, joy and self-sacrifice, which are not ancillary to most people’s moral experiences, but central. The evolutionary approach also leads many scientists to neglect the concept of individual responsibility and makes it hard for them to appreciate that most people struggle toward goodness, not as a means, but as an end in itself.

Bob Herbert is off today.

A version of this article appeared in print on April 7, 2009, on page A29 of the New York edition.

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[光明译丛]哲学的终结  

大卫·布鲁克斯 著 吴万伟 译

光明网-光明观察 刊发时间:2009-04-14 14:17:27




  苏格拉底谈话。在他的哲学途径背后的假设以及后来百万人的途径的背后是道德思考基本上是理性和深思的事情:思考道德问题,发现正义原则,然后使用。

  迈克尔·葛詹尼加(Michael Gazzaniga)在他2008年的书《人》中写到,这个研究伦理学的途径的问题之一是“很难发现道德推理和刺激性的道德行为之间的相关关系,比如帮助他人。实际上,在很多研究中,没有发现一个。”

  今天,许多心理学家、认知科学家、甚至哲学家开始拥抱关于伦理学的不同观点。在这个观点看来,道德思考更像美学思考。在我们环顾世界的时候,我们不断地评价我们看到的一切。观看和评价不是两个分开的过程。他们是连在一起的,基本上是同时进行的。

  正如加州理工学院的史蒂文·库沃茨(Steven Quartz)在最近由约翰坦普尔顿基金会(John Templeton Foundation)主办的伦理学讨论会上说的,“我们的大脑每时每刻都在计算价值。我们看到的每个东西,我们就形成隐含的偏爱。其中有些成为我们认识到的东西,有些仍然处于我们意识不到的状态。但是我们的大脑赞成的东西,我们的大脑演化成发现环境中的有价值的东西。”

  想象一下如果你把新食品放进嘴里会发生什么事。比不必要决定它是否可恶。你就是知道。你不必要决定一个风景到底美不美,你就是知道。

  道德判断就像这一样。它们是迅速的本能性的决定,涉及大脑的感情处理部分。我们中许多人做出迅速的道德判断,关于某些事情是否公平或者好不好。我们还在婴孩的时候就开始这样做了,在我们会说话之前。甚至在长大后,我们常常不能向自己解释我们为什么觉得某些事情是错误的。

  换句话说,推理出现得较晚,常常受到在它之前的感情的指导。如果正如弗吉尼亚大学乔纳森·海特(Jonathan Haidt)令人难忘的描写,“感情实际上负责道德庙宇,道德推理实际上是像牧师一样匍匐在上帝面前的仆人。”

  所以问题就变成了:到底什么影响道德感情呢?答案一直是演化,但是在最近一些年,越来越多的人赞同演化不仅仅是竞争的观点。它也是在群体内合作的问题。人类就像蜜蜂一样,长期以来就是靠是否有劳动分工的能力来决定生存或者死亡的。互相帮助,在面对共同的威胁时站在一起。我们的道德情感和本能中许多反映了这个历史。我们不仅仅关心我们个人的权利,甚至别人的权利,我们还关心忠诚、尊重、传统、宗教等。我们都是成功合作者的后代。

  这个演化途径的第一个好处是它强调了道德本能的社会本质。人们不是离散的个体冷漠地争论道德问题,他们是联系在一起组成共同体和相互影响的网络。

  第二个好处是它隐含着对于人性的更温暖的看法。演化总是关于竞争的,但是对于人来说,正如达尔文猜测的,群体间的竞争把我们变成了很好的合作者,同情他人的人和为他人着想的人—至少在我们家庭我们的群体或者国家内。

  第三个好处是它解释了我们在不毁灭尊严和选择的情况下的破坏性生活方式。海特认为道德本能是第一位的,但它不是独裁者。有时候,在我们生活中常常最重要的时刻,当我们实际上使用理性来战胜道德本能时,那些理由,连同新的道德本能常常来自我们的朋友。

  这种从感情角度看待道德的途径的兴起和主导地位是个划时代的变化。它挑战了所有的传统。它挑战了大部分人看待哲学的书呆子方式。它挑战了《塔木德经》的传统连同其对文本的超级理性探索。它挑战了新的无神论者,这些人自认为是在用理性和信仰作战,对纯粹理性的力量,以及自己推理的纯粹性的无法证明的信仰。

  最后,它也挑战了研究道德的科学家本身。他们擅长于解释人们是如何做危害和公平的判断的,但他们仍然挣扎于解释敬畏、超验、爱国主义、快乐、自我牺牲等种种感情。它们对于许多人的道德经验来说不是附属性的,而是核心的。演化的途径也让许多科学家忽略个人责任的概念,让他们难于欣赏到多数人努力向善的过程不是作为手段,而是作为目的本身。

  译自:The End of Philosophy by David Brooks

  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/opinion/07Brooks.html?_r=1

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